#1-The Incident 02-27-21

 For all my friends, students, customers, associates and interested parties I would like to explain the ongoing situation resulting from my accident in late February 2021. While instructing a private pilot in the multi engine airplane, we experienced an unresolvable mechanical problem that resulted in a landing with collapsed nose gear. Fortunately, there were no injuries however there was substantial damage to the aircraft that resulted in a personal loss to only myself. Air traffic controllers contacted the FAA, who immediately started making demands without due process of any nature. Student and myself were ordered to submit written statements, aircraft recovery personnel along with airport officials were asked to take and submit photos of the aircraft, tower controllers were interviewed and recorded tapes reviewed. I was never given the option to respond to their questions or given my rights, if any and although FAA inspectors consider me uncooperative, they did manage to fabricate a case against me solely using my written statement and those during a conference call. They were never objective, impartial, genuinely investigating, trying to discover the cause but instead, accusatory, threatening, looking for rule infractions and assigning blame. They get away with it because the FAA is above the very laws they create, accuse others of violating, then “investigate”, offer mock appeals which are upheld, then finally assess summary judgement and punishment, ALL from within the agency.

This is what happened:

I was giving multi engine instruction to a Private Pilot student in our PA23-150. The first hour consisted of power off, on, accelerated stalls while turning left & right, escaping from wind shear, slow flight, steep turns, cabin & engine fire procedures, engine shutdown, feather and restarts, VMC demos, emergency descent, various abnormal/emergency procedures. After the basic air work we entered the traffic pattern and conducted several normal, short, and engine out landings, including one feathered. Five of these approaches and landings were uneventful but then on subsequent approach, we experienced an unsafe nose gear indication that never resolved. During troubleshooting, we had the gear handle resetting back to neutral position which is indicative of fully extended/pressurized struts, the gear visible in the cowling mirror and a warning horn upon closing throttles(unsafe). At this point, I suspected a bad down switch and because there were no additional procedures to confirm this, I elected to try lightly loading the nose gear during 4 touch and go landings, applying progressively greater pressure to the nose gear with each. Based upon this, I confirmed the nose gear was down, locked, able to support the aircraft, and most likely just a faulty switch. I then requested a runway away from other aircraft operations, and advised the tower that I wanted to stop on the runway after landing to inspect the nose gear.

During the approach we shutdown the left engine to preclude unnecessary engine/propeller damage should a gear collapse actually occur. The approach was easily made with the remaining engine, touchdown was normal, and gear supported the aircraft; however, as the aircraft slowed, a slight right turn began, accompanied by a scuffing/rubbing noise. Left pedal was applied which initially maintained the centerline but soon after the aircraft began a violent right, tires screeching turn that was arrested only by maximum left braking. Airplane was now tracking parallel to the centerline accompanied by a severe vibration/scuffing noise approximately 8 feet from the runway edge but after 4 seconds or so, nose gear collapsed. The remaining 150′ was done on the forward nose section and main gear. It was later determined that the nose gear lower forward drag link had failed rendering the gear unsteerable and as more weight had transferred to gear, it turned fully right, breaking off the limit pin.(approx 45°) Fortunately, full asymmetrical left braking was just enough to counter this but the hydraulic piston holding the wheel down could not, by itself, handle the side load of a 3000# airplane decelerating against the dragging wheel. It failed, bending more than 90°, in the fully extended position, see picture.

The Investigation

From the very first contact, the FAA was accusatory, demanding and appeared more interested in the persuit of legal action rather than a factual investigation of causal events leading to the accident. Requests were made for written statements without any explanation of my rights as a US citizen and when I asked, no answer was provided. I responded with an email addressing this and respectfully asked them to provide the basis for the statement and my legal obligations to respond. None was given; however I had nothing to hide so I gave my written narrative of events anyway.

On Monday morning, inspector showed up at my company and handed me an FAA brochure explaining their right to investigate but not anything about my rights. Brochure made a disengenuous claim about fairness, cooperation and disclosure; of which I saw nothing from the Milwaukee FSDO inspectors, and as previously stated quite the opposite. From the way this FAA man conducted himself with the snide remarks and comments I could see where the focus would be so I told him I didn’t care for it, especially in light of the way FAA expects 100% cooperation and agreement from me on any matter. Seemed to me, a little one sided and turning into a witch hunt so I said as much.

After that he decided that he wanted the maintenance records going back several years, even after previously stating that the records looked good. Immediately after this; my supervising inspector decided he had additional questions (based solely on my written statement) and reversed himself after previously classifying as incident. I refused to put anything else in writing until having a chance to first discuss it then left him a voicemail requesting to talk, repeatedly trying his office/cell number. I tried calling/talking/texting/emailing him and others including the chief, assistant chief and even the regional office that refused the call. Of course, no one returned my calls until a day later, when POI asked if I was still willing to talk and if so, suggested a conference call to which I reluctantly agreed because I thought it would be my only chance to explain what happened.

The call began on Thursday (5 days after accident), consisting of 4 people listening in plus myself. (The Chief, assistant chief, POI, and recording person). I was asked about why I shut down a perfectly good engine prior to landing, once for instructional purposes and second time for the last landing, with the nose gear issue. They didn’t like either answer because it’s against their recommendations as published in the training manuals and guidance, however I know of no law preventing this. Furthermore, their own orders specifically delineate the difference between guidance and directive with the former being recommended or advisory, the latter being regulatory/mandatory.

They chose to interpret that guidance as a directive and used it along with afalse statement to fabricate justification to terminate long held pilot examiner privileges. During this conference call, I was repeatedly asked about shutting down a perfectly good engine, how many landings we did with unsafe gear (last only), how many landings made with gear indication flashing (none), some nonsense about could my student have handled the aircraft had I become incapacitated (the last mile), did I crank the blade horizontal (no), a windmilling engine, slight crosswind from the left causing the drift, left engine having a generator, etc.

None of them knew much about the aircraft, offered a better/different solution or tried to fairly judge my actions, only to accuse, ridicule and search for mistakes. Not sure of their actual experience but it did appear very limited based upon their concerns about propeller feathering, especially below 3000′ above ground. Even above this altitude, it’s common, among multi engine pilots to find a reluctance to feather the prop and secure the engine, even when necessary during emergency condition

Always thought I was doing my students a service by having them land at least once with a secured engine and quite frankly, thought it was perfectly safe as it was conducted under controlled, ideal conditions in a training environment. Certainly, safer than an actual emergency but the Milwaukee inspectors disagreed and 2 hours after conference call, I was terminated for cause as pilot examiner, a designation held almost 40 years.

To make their case, they twisted my statements, quoted policy as regulatory, and even made-up things I never said. Although I was terminated that same day, I wasn’t notified for 12 days; barely within the 15 day appeal deadline but I made it. The termination was upheld 25 days late

Meanwhile the FAA continued to push their case for pilot certificate suspension while I sent emails to Congressional leaders, Senators, State legislators, flying publications, etc. Most politely listened or responded sympathetically but were not in position to oppose or demand any explanation from FAA. Inspectors interviewed controllers and airport personnel, listened to tower tapes, and pulled every document all the way back to my private pilot written test and check rides, hundreds of pages. I have no significant history, flying, driving, criminal, financial, personal, etc. Just an average person but, they made their case and I received the following notification July 13, 20

Notification of pending suspension.

Based on the following facts and circumstances, it appears that you violated the regulations of the Federal Aviation Administration.

1. You now hold, and at all times relevant to this Notice held:(a) Airline Transport Pilot Certificate with airplane single and multi engine land ratings; (b) Flight Instructor Certificate with airplane single engine, multiengine, and instrument ratings; (c) Ground Instructor Certificate issued under 14 C.F.R.part 61; and (d) Mechanic Certificate 

2. On or about February 27, 2021, you were pilot in command of civil aircraft, a Piper PA23 twin-engine airplane with retractable landing gear, acting as a certified flight instructor to a trainee pilot passenger onboard in the vicinity of Wittman Regional Airport, in Oshkosh, Wisconsin (KOSH)

3. The Piper PA23 type certificate requires that the aircraft be equipped with operable landing gear for type certificatio

4. During the the flight training, aircrafts unsafe landing gear indication light intermittently flashed.

5. You instructed the student pilot in completing a single engine landing on runway 18 and shut down the left engine.

6. Landed on runway 18, with one engine, completed the requested full stop, and taxied back for takeoff.

7. You continued to conduct multiple touch and go takeoff and landings on runway 18 with the unsafe gear indication light intermittently flashing.

8. On the last landing you requested to land on runway 27 with a full stop.

9. Prior to landing on runway 27 you shut down the left engine.

10. After touch down on runway 27,the aircraft yawed to the right and you instructed the student pilot to apply the left brake.

11. After applying the brakes, nose gear collapsed on runway 27.

12. On or about February 27, 2021, you operated the aircraft when it was not in an airworthy condition.

13. On or about February 27, 202I, you conducted multiple take offs and landings with inoperative equipment.

14. On or about February 27, 202l, you operated in a careless and reckless manner so as to endanger the life or property of another when you purposefully shut down the left engine prior to landing when the landing gear was inoperable.

15. Your operation, as described above, was careless or reckless so as to endanger the life or property of another. As a result of the foregoing, it appears that you violated the following Federal Aviation Regulation: a) 14 C.F.R 91.7(a), which states, in relevant part, no person may operate a civil aircraft unless it is in an airworthy condition. b) 14 C.F.R 91.13(a) (non-residual), which states, in relevant part, that no person may operate an aircraft in a careless or reckless manner so as to endanger the life or property of another. c) 14 C.F.R. 91.213, which states, in relevant part, no person may take off an aircraft with inoperative instruments or equipment installed. issued under 14 C.F.R. part 43.

I was given 3 options to respond: 1. Accept the 6 month suspension. 2. Written response to the 15 charges. Or 3. In person review (Zoom meeting). I chose options 2 & 3

Option 2 response follows:

To reiterate and directly address the specific violations in the proposed suspension letter:

#2. A Certificated Private Pilot receiving dual instruction is a flight crewmember, NOT a passenger.

#3. The aircraft was in compliance the entire flight, was preflighted, had a recent inspection, and I had personally checked each gear, including the forward drag link. Once the gear indicated unsafe, we took all necessary steps to clearly identify the problem, including the touch and goes.

#4. Not true. We had the unsafe condition ONE TIME and it never indicated down/safe again. I have repeatedly answered this question and just because FSDO keeps claiming it, doesn’t make it so. Had I ever gotten a safe indication after an unsafe indication, I would have landed, inspected it and towed aircraft if necessary. I resent the implication here as no Professional pilot would press on with unsafe indication, myself included.

#5. There is no regulation preventing this and it was safely conducted.

#6. Not illegal or unsafe.

#7. Not true. Indication was not flashing, it was out, and the touch and goes were part of my troubleshooting procedure not full weight bearing landings. I don’t believe there is any rule REQUIRING me to land without trying to resolve the issue.

#9. I secured the left engine prior to our last landing to minimize aircraft damage should the gear collapse. This is a common practice in industry and frequently done.

#10. I was flying the aircraft. Touchdown was normal, initial rollout normal then a slight yaw right accompanied by a scuffing/rubbing noise, I compensated with left rudder then aircraft entered a violent, hard right turn with screeching tires. I instructed the student to use the left brake as I do not have brakes on my side of the airplane. He did, which is the only reason we remained on the runway. Note accompanying pictures.

#11. With the maximum left brake application we had a fully deflected right nose gear accompanied by severe rubbing/vibration because it was being dragged sidewards, absolutely necessary to keep us on the runway. Yes, it collapsed but had it held a few more seconds we would have been stopped. Only reason it held that long was due to a hydraulically locked strut.

#12. I did not. Once unsafe the scheduled lesson was over, the resultant touch and goes were part of troubleshooting not to finish the lesson.

#13. No, I didn’t and I have explained this repeatedly.

#14. Shutdown was necessary and not careless or reckless, landing gear was inoperable because it failed in flight. No one’s life was in danger until the aircraft was going to leave the runway and fortunately we prevented that. Nothing I did, including shutting down the engine caused any of this.

#15. Our actions prevented a runway excursion and quite possibly a fatal accident. I stand by what I did and challenge anyone to have handled it better.

At no time did I conduct an unsafe operation or operate contrary to FARs, although it may appear this way because I have been unjustly accused by a prejudiced, disingenuous principal operations inspector. I do not wish to attack these folks, only to defend against their misrepresentations and false statements which shouldn’t be necessary if I was truly guilty. The termination for cause from the examiners designation and this pending certificate action is based upon those wrong statements although my actions have yet to be reviewed impartially by a neutral 3rd party or professional pilots. Notwithstanding this, I have been treated fairly by the FAA throughout my career and was not aware of their displeasure with me prior to the accident.

Regarding the rules I am accused of violating:91.7, 13 & 213.

There was no means for me to discover the malfunctioning nose gear until the malfunction actually took place, 90′ into the flight. The four touch and go landings done afterwards were part of my troubleshooting procedure and necessary to ascertain the weight bearing capacity of the nose gear, which it had, a fact demonstrated by the after landing rollout, observation by ATC, and the skid marks on runway. (see attached picture) The nose wheel collapsed only after heavy side loading caused by the maximum asymmetric left brake application necessary to straighten aircraft when the uncommanded nosewheel deflected hard right. At no time did we attempt a full weight bearing rollout with the unsafe indication except for the last landing which based upon what I had observed, would support the weight. Problem was, a broken forward, lower drag link that prevented ground steering and went full deflection past the established turn limits; a condition not discoverable in flight. It was an unusual mechanical problem, not foreseeable, never known to happen before or experienced by others, without resolution by anybody and I have not heard anything to the contrary, only complaints by inexperienced pilots (MKE Inspectors) about what I did.

91.13 At no time was anyone’s life or property in jeopardy. Regarding the engine shutdowns; both were done under controlled conditions, easily made at or above a safe glide slope, within the intended touchdown area. The aircraft has climb/go around capability and engine can always be restarted. First one conducted was for student training purposes to demonstrate how easily it can be made and to preclude unreasonable fears pilots have about single engine landings. I always thought I was serving my students by doing these and had I known that the FAA didn’t approve, never would have done them, Even so, I don’t recall anything in the regulations preventing a secured engine approach/landing and believe that it’s safer than an actual emergency. As it is only referenced in policy and training manuals as “FAA recommends” which is guidance information and not directive/mandated, I thought I was in full compliance. Where exactly is it addressed that a training scenario feathered landing is in violation of FARs? Is “recommended” no longer guidance but a directive? Many others have done this without reproach and I don’t see why I am not afforded the same consideration. Second/last secured engine landing was to preclude unnecessary engine/propeller damage in the event of just such an occurrence and common in industry as it is hardly necessary to destroy the aircraft should the gear collapse. I thought; based upon our troubleshooting procedure, gear was down, locked, able to support the aircraft and it was, but as previously stated, there was no inflight method to determine that I would be unable to steer the aircraft. NOTHING I did or didn’t do contributed in any way toward the accident. The outcome would have come out exactly regardless of my or anyone else’s actions.

Violation of 91.213. (Inoperative equipment)

What other choices did I have? If I had left both engines operating the aircraft would have had exactly the same glide path over the same areas and ended up on its nose after the nose gear collapsed, exactly like it did. Is a pilot expected to assume that absence of a gear down indication will lead to a gear collapse or that it’s most likely an indication problem and the gear is safe? And how would I know the difference without additional landings to load the gear?

Never received any response to these questions or my explanations other than to be informed of the interview date with the FAA lawyer, scheduled to be held September 17, 2021 at 10:00

Option 3 Response: The zoom meeting with FAA lawyer

Although, officially, I was meeting with the FAA lawyer, there were 3 others monitoring, namely the Milwaukee FSDO station manager, the assistant chief and the accusing Inspector who were not allowed to ask or answer questions, only there to observe.

I was permitted to speak as long as I wanted so I described what happened along with my actions, justification for what I did, my interpretation of the law, the limited alternatives, their misrepresentations, prejudiced investigation, etc. Also discussed were serious pilot deficiencies observed during flight tests I had administered, the lack of FAA concern regarding unsafe pilot actions, and safety issues noted during actual emergencies, such as misidentification of failed engine, reluctance to feather an inoperative engine, improper procedures and failure of FAA to make any attempts to correct those deficiencies, particularly at large training academies.

I stated that had FAA ever voiced concerns about my training methods, I would have changed them and despite their claims otherwise, I have never “frequently violated policy” during training and flight tests. Policy does not constitute a directive and is clearly explained in their own order 8900.2A and I explained that in great detail, along with the FARs I was alleged to have violated and that my actions were necessary, and in compliance with those rules.

The meeting concluded when I finished (about 45′) then lawyer asked if I had anything additional, then explained my rights to attorney, or make additional written statements so I responded by reiterating the important points, then requested a formal interpretation of the allegedly violated rules.

The follow up written statement to FAA lawyer.

There are several additional comments I would like to make; first of which is, had I been permitted to explain my actions initially instead of being judged guilty, I believe the situation would have been explained satisfactorily. I tried but the investigating inspector was only interested in finding something wrong with my actions and although he may not have liked my attitude, how was I supposed to feel with his accusatory questions? He got everything he requested anyway as I cancelled my morning schedule to show him the airplane, the records, and answer his questions. Even making several trips between office and home to accommodate his additional requests. He then requested my written statement and to contact POI, which I did. When I contacted supervising POI, Joe S, he only asked if I would have done anything different. I said no and he stated “that’s all you can ask” and said it would be classified as an incident. First inspector then asked for maintenance records going back several years after saying records looked good after which Joe emailed that he had “additional questions” based upon my written statement. I tried calling him to explain exactly what happened but he didn’t answer. Also tried assistant chief, chief then regional office about the investigation turning into a ” witch hunt” after saying the same to John S. ( investigating inspector). I also commented ” backstabbing FAA” which I felt was justified after decades of support only to be unfairly accused. No one wanted to talk as I was to respond in writing only which I assumed would be used against me, and it was. They twisted my words against me, and did so again on the conference call of March 4th. Their minds were made up the instant I began fighting back against their undeserved criticism and I have yet to receive an impartial review to date. 2 hours after the March 4 conference call, I was terminated for cause as pilot examiner but notified 12 days later. The termination was upheld after appeal but based on the same disinformation from the same accusing Inspector. The pending certificate suspension, which will undoubtedly take place right on schedule will not enhance safety, only to further punish me for circumstances beyond my control. This ill will, hard feelings and punishment are all so unnecessary as there was no danger to anyone other than to my student and myself resulting from a non steerable nose gear. There was nothing unsafe until the aircraft turned violently on the runway and we corrected that. I’ve said all this before but I am still surprised by the FAA handling my accident in this manner as I considered these guys my friends immediately before. How I suddenly became a law breaking, unsafe pilot is a complete mystery to me and was even offered a job as ASI during previous years FSDO meetings. As a pilot examiner, I took my position very seriously and was never in it for the money, I represented the FAAs proficiency requirements, rules and policies although there were occasional applicant complaints from unsatisfactory flight tests.

FAA inspectors have recently stated that I frequently deviated from policy during training and flight tests, neither of which is true. 2. I have always tried to teach beyond the scope of just” enough to pass a flight test” , often well in excess of the applicable ACS/PTS, hoping that the pilots I trained would have the skills avoiding/coping with typical accident scenarios such as fuel starvation, engine failure immediately after takeoff, stall/spin prevention and recovery, distractions during critical phases of flight, 60° banked turns, airspeed control with and without properly functioning instruments, crosswind takeoffs and landings in combination with short/soft procedures, unusual attitude recoveries with vertigo and malfunctioning instruments, delayed stall recoveries utilizing all available controls while rolling from banked attitude through level to bank in opposite direction minimizing altitude loss and escaping from wind shear. For multi engine students, frequent inflight feather and restarts, low altitude engine out operations, IFR engine outs including engine failure during turns, VMC practice and recognition/understanding of when stall occurs before loss of directional control, unexpected double engine failure, more. I am not doing any of this for my benefit or ego, only to train a safer pilot and keep them alive and prosperous. This also includes the feathered landings which I thought made them safer and less and less reluctant to feather in actual emergency although I have ceased doing those. Had I known that the FAA considered any of this hazardous, I would never have done them on that basis alone and if not appreciated, why would I risk my livelihood to do them. I was only trying to teach students that inflight feathering is relatively safe and should not be feared in actual circumstances. (A common problem) Even some pilot examiners have voiced concern about feathering at altitude and FAA inspectors are always nervous about feathering, at any altitude.

Due to recent events and proposed certificate action I am requesting a formal legal interpretation of the following FARs:

91.3 Responsibility and authority of pilot in command.

If I (as PIC) am the final authority as to the operation of the aircraft; why does an FAA inspector, with limited experience and no viable alternatives have the authority to override this command prerogative pertaining to troubleshooting during abnormal operations. 

Regarding emergency operations; Am I legally mandated to declare an emergency when one does not exist but is possible?

 Specifically; I had an unsafe nose gear indication yet gear was visible in the cowling mirror, hydraulic system had increased to handle detent release which recentered gear lever and then conducted several weight bearing touchdowns on nose gear. Based upon these actions, I concluded the most likely condition was a bad switch or false indication but there was always a chance of collapse with the abnormal indication. Was I required to declare emergency on the basis that one was possible?

91.7 Civil aircraft airworthiness

If a flight is commenced legally and an unairworthy condition develops inflight, may I continue to troubleshoot outside the procedures in AFM or must I land at the conclusion of established procedures?Specifically, does this regulation prohibit me from additional troubleshooting of a  gear problem by incremental weight bearing during subsequent touch and go landings or am I required to land immediately with the unsafe indication? I ask because that was the exact reason used to prosecute me under 91.7

91.13 Careless or reckless operation

Is the careless or reckless determination made by unified, unbiased, experienced pilots, or can this be made by any one? 

Is every maneuver I conduct in a training environment subject to a careless and reckless determination? 

For example: If I intentionally have a student land with one engine inoperative (feathered), is this considered careless and reckless operation?  

These are the conditions under which the feathered engine landing was made: a normal approach, at or above the glide path, aircraft has capability to maintain altitude in this configuration and can climb it gear is retracted,  and landing was made in the touchdown zone.  Additionally,  I only do this under favorable conditions of weight, performance, weather, traffic, etc. If this is considered unsafe, may I ask why?

If this is considered careless and reckless, why is this considered so when an actual engine failure landing is not? 

Notwithstanding emergency authority granted under 91.3, if I elect to land without declaring emergency, is it automatically assumed and again; exactly how is this any less risky than a demonstrated one?

How about emergency drills such as a simulated engine failure immediately simulated engine failure immediately after takeoff in a single engine airplane or other scenarios beyond the scope of ACS? Eg, full stalls controlled by rudder alone, until recovery initiated, then at maximum angle of attack possible while climbing, or crosswind landings at maximum velocity for available rudder.(usually in excess of demonstrated crosswind value), 60° banked turns, unusual attitude recoveries with instructor induced vertigo. All things I feel necessary to train safe pilots. 

To restate this another way: Can I legally teach in excess of the airman standards (ACS or PTS) or is this a violation of 91.13, and at the whim of any FAA inspector, especially one with a personal bias against me?

Do FAA inspectors have the authority to ignore FAA mandates and official orders choosing between directives and policy to fit their case narrative? For example: quoting policy as regulatory.

Never received an answer to any of these and about 5 weeks later received email upholding the suspension then ordering me to surrender my ATP and CFI certificates prior to November 30th. I appealed my suspension to NTSB then told to keep using certificates until NTSB ruling. Case will be heard by an administrative law judge and I will be given 30 days notice of such.

Stating my defense with NTSB (for this posting I have deleted personal information. Names, certificate numbers, etc)

My affirmative defenses are as follows:

Relating to my alleged violation of 14CFR 91. 13 Careless or reckless operation, 14CFR 91.7 Airworthiness and 14CFR 91.213 Instrument and equipment requirements.

For intentional engine shutdown and continued operation after unsafe nose gear indication.

There is no specific regulation preventing the intentional shutdown/feathering/securing of a single engine on a multi engine aircraft and has never been considered careless or reckless or even referred to as such; in fact FAA actually recommends this with an inoperative engine to reduce drag on single engine approaches.

Common procedure in industry, among professional pilots, is to secure at least one engine, as a precaution to prevent unnecessary aircraft damage when a gear collapse is possible. There is nothing in FAA publications specifically stating that a precautionary feathering, or actual feathering in training environment is unsafe or not permitted. Closest mention are policy statements for examiner conduct during flight tests and recommendations in training publications to simulate engine out operations below 3000 agl.

FAA Order 8000.95A pg1.1 clearly delineates the difference between Directives and Guidance, directives are mandatory, guidance is recommended only. FAA inspectors chose to interpret guidance and policy as regulatory in direct opposition to their own order. Furthermore, Milwaukee inspectors intentionally claimed statements I never made, such as “routinely disregarded FAA policy during training flights and while administering practical tests” completely disregarding that policy is recommended, and not regulatory.

I only did this occasionally for realistic training purposes under controlled conditions and never on flight tests. Another false/misleading statement made by FAA was that the OEI approaches were made over a populated area while carrying a passenger.

First one, conducted by student, was over the airport; the subsequent OEI done by me, passed over houses for 1/4 mile on a stabilized approach at or above 3-degree glide slope. Nothing out of the A

 The “passenger” was the private pilot trainee flying the airplane, and no one else was onboard. Then the false statement about the gear lights flashing. I was repeatedly asked this along with how many landings we did with unsafe gear indication (none). I did do 4 touch and goes with progressively heavier loadings on the nose wheel to confirm weight bearing, which it had, and most professional pilots would have done this, despite the FAA mocking me for it.

14 CFR 91.3 gives PIC final authority as to the operation of the aircraft and there is no regulation requiring me to land immediately without troubleshooting.

In summary, I was in compliance with those rules.

I submitted 3 pictures and associated explanations

• Beginning skid marks

• Final portion of rollout showing disabled aircraft

•Failed drag link

Skid marks show first 1000′ rollout normal, slight deviation beginning, then at 1200′ the violent right turn, subsequently arrested at 1450′, aircraft tracking parallel to runway edge from 1550′ to 1650, gear collapses, stopped 150′ later.

• Failed forward drag link showing failure that inhibited nose wheel steering.

Although picture showed drag link in proper position, both drag link arms were found hanging down from attaching bolts.

• Bent and fully extended hydraulic strut pr

oving gear was down and locked.

The following are my affirmative defenses to the numbered paragraphs in the FAA complaint.

#1. You now hold. and at all times relevant to this Notice held: (a) Airline Transport Pilot Certificate number xxxxxxxxx, with airplane single and multiengine land ratings; (b) Flight Instructor Certificate with airplane single engine, multiengine, and instrument ratings; (c) Ground Instructor Certificate number xxxxxxx; issued under 14 C.F.R. part 6l; and (d) Mechanic Certificate number xxxxxxx, issued under l4 C.F.R. part 43.

#1. Denied: Not entirely correct as I also hold type ratings for: DC3, DC3TP

2. On or about February 27, 2021, you were pilot in command of civil aircraft, registration number Nxxxxxx, a Piper PA23 twin-engine airplane with retractable landing gear, acting as a certified flight instructor to a trainee pilot passenger onboard in the vicinity of Wittman Regional Airport, in Oshkosh, Wisconsin (KOSH).

#2. Denied: Because the” trainee pilot passenger” was actually a certificated private pilot receiving dual instruction and as such, a required flight crewmember and not a passenger.

3. The Piper PA23 type certificate requires that the aircraft be equipped with operable landing gear for type certification.

#3. Denied: Aircraft was equipped with operable landing gear at time of departure and unsafe gear condition developed in flight. We took the necessary steps to resolve the problem including the touch and goes that were necessary to test/confirm weight bearing capacity of the nose gear. Aircraft had been preflighted, gear personally inspected by me, and completed a recent annual inspection, 7 hours prior. Although this was alleged to be a violation of FAR 91.7; “continued flight with inoperative equipment required for certification”, FAR 91.3 (Responsibility and Authority of Pilot in command) grants me final authority as to the operation of the aircraft and therefore when to continue/discontinue the flight upon developing conditions. Also, as an aside to this; there is no rule requiring me to land immediately when additional actions can be taken to clearly ascertain the full extent of a malfunction when an un airworthy condition occurs. The abnormal/emergency procedures did not address the exact condition we had so it was necessary to amend these with the touch and goes.

#4. During the flight training, Nxxxx’s unsafe landing gear indication light intermittently flashed.

#4. Denied: It wasn’t flashing, it was out. Everything performed normally until 90′ into the flight, then, after the gear extended normally, the light indicated safe, then immediately went out and never indicated down/safe again. Had I ever attained a safe indication after this; I would have landed, inspected the gear and towed the aircraft, if necessary. The flight was only continued long enough to confirm gear position and no other reason. No Professional pilot would ever press on with a known unsafe indication, myself included.

5. You instructed the student pilot in completing a single engine landing on runway 18 and shut down the left engine.

#5. Denied: As previously stated; he was not a student pilot, but instead was a certificated private pilot with 120 hours receiving multi engine instruction. I did have him shut down and feather the engine for training purposes but this was conducted under controlled conditions of weather, weight, traffic, proficiency, etc. and prior to the gear problem. I do this occasionally because I believe it’s necessary for pilot confidence during a real emergency to have previously done this in a relaxed environment. Not contrary to 91.13 or prevented by any regulations, only indirectly referenced as “policy” and not mandated. Milwaukee FSDO inspectors even misinterpreted this policy as a Directive, contrary to their own order (8000.95a) which clearly explains the difference between that which is mandatory versus recommended. This was supplemented by a false claim, then used as justification for suspension of pilot examiner privileges held nearly 38 years.

6.Nxxxxx landed on runway 18, with one engine, completed the requested full stop, and taxied back for takeoff.

#6. Denied: This occurred before the gear malfunction and not related to the accident. It was done for training purposes and there was nothing illegal or unsafe about any of it. Although single engine climb performance is limited, a safe approach can be made as the aircraft can hold altitude if necessary and then climb once gear is retracted. If the approach is normal, planned, stabilized, and safe airspeed maintained there is no risk to anyone. We made a stabilized approach to the intended touchdown zone and landed in this area, Minor braking was made and we exited runway at first turn off, conducted single engine taxi then restarted engine and departed on 18 .

 7.You continued to conduct multiple touch and go takeoff and landings on runway 18 with the unsafe gear indication light intermittently flashing.

#7. Denied: As I previously stated; it was not flashing, it was out and never came back on. We conducted the procedures for the unsafe indication which consisted of, recycling, confirmation of pressure build up in main system with gear handle returning to neutral, a visual indication in cowling mirror and closing both power levers which sounded the warning horn (unsafe). There were no procedures after this so I made some of my own; namely, the 4 touch and goes, light touch at first, progressively heavier, loading nose gear only with enough speed maintained to unload it if it would not support the weight. My conclusion after this was that we had a bad downlock switch and safe gear. However the actual condition we had was an unsteerable nose wheel which was only detected in the second half of the rollout when it suddenly deflected hard right. It was not detectable or foreseeable and the only way to counter this was to instruct the student to use the left brake which straightened out the aircraft and kept us on the runway.

8. On the last landing you requested to land on runway 27 with a full stop.

#8. Denied : Reason for selecting this runway was so that we wouldn’t interfere with the other traffic operating on 18. because I knew the runway would be closed temporarily as I intended to make a full stop landing, get out, inspect gear and affect repairs prior to towing.

9. Prior to landing on runway 27 you shut down Nxxxx’s left engine.

#9. Denied: Engine was secured in order to minimize aircraft damage should an unanticipated gear collapse occur and this is frequently done by professional pilots in similar circumstances. A precautionary engine shutdown violates no rule or puts anyone’s life in danger. A stabilized approach at or above the glide slope was made to the intended flare point with a normal touchdown and initially; a normal rollout, then aircraft began to wander off the centerline. This was accompanied by a slight scuffing/rubbing noise and although I compensated it took full left pedal to maintain runway centerline. Then it violently turned hard right with screeching tires and a pronounced vibration/scuffing noise.

10. After Nxxxxx touched down on runway 27, the aircraft yawed to the right and you instructed the student pilot to apply the left brake.

#10. Denied: He was not a student pilot; he was a certificated Private pilot with over 100 hours flight time. Aircraft performed as expected for the first half of ground roll but as nose wheel loaded it began slight turn which was corrected with left rudder pressure but then it violently turned hard right accompanied by severe vibration/scuffing noise that was arrested only by the left brake application which I had to instruct other pilot to use as my side of aircraft does not have brakes. This kept us from leaving the runway.ot vs FAA

 11. After applying the brakes, Nxxxxx’s nose gear collapsed on runway 27.

#11. Denied: Only the left brake was applied which was necessary due to the fully turned nose wheel. Accompanying this left brake application was a severe rubbing/vibration because it was being dragged sidewards, absolutely necessary to keep us on the runway. Yes, it collapsed but had it held a few more seconds we would have been stopped. Only reason it held that long was due to a hydraulically locked strut that eventually failed, bending 90° in the fully extended/locked position.

12. On or about February 27, 2021, you operated Nxxxxx when it was not in an airworthy condition.

#12. Denied: I did not. We departed in full compliance and the unsafe gear indication developed 90′ into the flight and the scheduled lesson was over, the resultant touch and goes were part of troubleshooting not to finish the lesson.

I3. On or about February 27 , 2021 , you operated Nxxxx on multiple take offs and landings with inoperative equipment.

#13 Denied: The situation was forced upon us, which we dealt with as necessary to determine the weight bearing capacity of the nose gear only and we maintained enough speed to unload the wheel if needed.

14. On or about February 27,2021. you operated Nxxxxx in a careless and reckless manner so as to endanger the life or property of another when you purposefully shut down the left engine on Nxxxxx prior to landing when the landing gear was inoperable.

#14. Denied: Shutdown was necessary and not careless or reckless, landing gear was inoperable because it failed in flight. No one’s life was in danger until the aircraft was going to leave the runway and fortunately, we prevented that. Nothing I did, including shutting down the engine caused any of this.

15. Your operation, as described above, was careless or reckless so as to endanger the life or property of another.

#15.Denied: All my actions; the training engine out landing, continued flight with malfunctioning landing gear, abnormal procedures conducted, runway selection away from other traffic and decision to secure engine for final landing were carefully planned, discussed with other crew member and agreed upon prior to execution. We followed standard practices and our actions ultimately prevented a runway excursion and quite possibly a fatal accident. I stand by what I did and challenge anyone to have handled it better, especially the Milwaukee inspectors who despite their posturing have failed to suggest a single corrective action.

As a result, you violated the following Federal Aviation Regulations: 14 C.F.R. $ 91.7(a), which states, in relevant part, no person may operate a civil aircraft unless it is in an airworthy condition.

Aircraft was in airworthy condition for about 90′ and unsafe condition developed in flight leaving me little choice but to either deal with the situation by continued troubleshooting or land immediately.

FAR 91.3 gives me the final authority as to the operation of the aircraft and says nothing about anyone, including a disingenuous FAA inspector being able to second guess my actions, after the fact, from a position of impunity.

b) 14 C.F.R. $ 91.13(a)(non-residual), which states, in relevant part, that no person may operate an aircraft in a careless or reckless manner so as to endanger the life or property of another.

This accusation is based upon a vague interpretation and the specific danger/risk has never been specified. I did not break this rule as there was no danger to anyone, until the nose wheel deflected hard right and the aircraft was going to leave the runway, which we prevented. Also there is nothing unsafe about an intentional single engine landing provided a normal approach, and safe airspeed is maintained.

c) 14 C.F.R. $ 91.213, which states, in relevant part, no person may take off an aircraft with inoperative instruments or equipment installed.

I did not violate 91.213: Aircraft departed, in full compliance with required instruments and equipment, operating normally until 90′ into the flight then the unsafe gear condition developed and could not be resolved. We conducted the established procedures and then the touch and goes to confirm gear position ( It was proven down). There was nothing left to try and my options were limited. During the initial part of rollout( 1000′), the nose wheel supported the aircraft but the gear had a broken lower, forward drag link which rendered nose wheel un steerable and it fully deflected 45°, breaking off turn limit stop pin. It only collapsed when it was subjected to severe side load caused by maximum left brake application necessary to keep aircraft on the runway. It supported the aircraft for about 4 seconds like that, then collapsed bending the hydraulic actuating strut 90+° in the fully extended position. I apologize for repeating myself but I wanted to address each of the aforementioned violations with my affirmative defenses.

Because the timeline of events is somewhat scrambled with the above paragraphs; I will relate the entire incident as it happened.

Was giving multi engine instruction in PA23-150 , The first hour consisting of power off, on, accelerated stalls, escaping from wind shear, slow flight, cabin & engine fire procedures, feather and restart procedures, VMC demonstrations, emergency descent, various abnormal/emergency procedures then entered the traffic pattern for normal, short, engine out landings including one feathered landing. All uneventful until our subsequent approach, during which we experienced an unsafe nose gear indication that never resolved. We had the gear handle resetting back to neutral position indicative of fully extended struts, gear visible in the cowling mirror but a horn warning upon closing throttles. There are no additional procedures so I elected to try lightly loading the nose gear during 4 touch and goes with each progressively greater. Based upon this, I concluded the nose gear was down, locked and able to support the aircraft so I requested a runway away from other aircraft operations, and advised the tower that I wanted to stop on the runway after landing to inspect the nose gear. During the approach we shutdown the left engine to preclude unnecessary engine/propeller damage should a gear collapse occur and the approach was easily made. The touchdown was normal however; as the aircraft slowed, a right turn began, accompanied by a scuffing/rubbing noise. Left pedal was applied but soon after the aircraft began a violent right turn that was arrested only by maximum left braking. This straightened the airplane so it was now tracking parallel to the centerline approximately 8 feet from the runway edge but after 5 seconds or so, the nose gear collapsed and the remaining 400′ was done on forward section/main gear. It was later determined that the nose gear lower forward drag link had failed rendering the gear unsteerable but it was able to free swivel. As more weight transferred to gear, it turned fully right, breaking off the limit pin.(approx 45°). Fortunately, full asymmetrical left braking was just enough to counter this but the hydraulic piston holding the wheel down could not, by itself; handle the side load of a 3000# airplane decelerating against the dragging wheel. It failed, bending more than 90°, in the fully extended position. The FAA has been unfair from the start of this, concentrating on enforcement instead of investigation as I have been discriminated against by an FAA inspector and Chief of the Milwaukee FSDO. They fabricated a case against me by intentional misrepresentation of my statements and then made false ones to support their narrative. Having worked with many different supervising Inspectors over the past 40 years; Joe S. has been the most difficult to work with, and carries some personal grudge against me. As my supervising POI, he has ignored my emails and phone calls, provided zero assistance during the DMS initiation as he was generally unavailable. He listens poorly, often jumps to conclusions without listening to the facts and concludes incorrectly. A classic example is when I texted him for assistance to confirm the FAA had actually issued my medical after a lengthy records review. His response was to state that I shouldn’t fly if I had a medical condition and had not even read my message. Probably the best example was this accident, and although he initially stated it was to be an incident, he then changed it to an accident. During this time, the maintenance inspector requested aircraft records going back several years after having previously stating the”records looked good”. After years of supporting FAA policies and rules, I felt this was being unreasonable, turning into a witch hunt, and that I was being backstabbed, so I said as much. I spent the rest of the day trying to find someone to complain to and made several attempts to explain the situation leading up to the accident but no one answered my calls/emails. This was to be turned around on me later when the FSDO claimed I had been abusive and calling their personal cell phones without authorization although both had personally given me their numbers. No one has ever cared to hear what happened but instead, they used my initial written statement and a conference call with 4 people listening in while the Chief, Mark K. interrogated me for 45′ , fishing for any reason to punish me for a condition that they could not have managed any better. I have yet to hear of any alternate course of action or better way of handling the gear problem I experienced, although they did appear very concerned that I would have a student land with a secured engine during the lesson and then myself for the last landing. FAA inspectors judging me are not interested in fairness or safety, just enforcement and I performed the same actions any Professional pilot would; I identified the problem, followed the applicable procedures, when those ran out, came up with my own, discussed everything with the second pilot, advised ATC of my intentions, chose runway isolated from other traffic, secured an engine to minimize aircraft damage, then made a safe, normal approach on glide path to intended flare point, maintained directional control after landing with left rudder until nose wheel jammed full right, then with left brake that I had to instruct my student to use as my side does not have brakes. These actions had nothing to do with the unresolvable mechanical problem other than keep the aircraft on the runway. I have frequently asked to be judged by Professional pilots such as Airline, Corporate, Chief pilots or managers with similar experience as myself but so far it’s been by relatively inexperienced pilots, misinterpreting policy as regulatory, carrying out a biased agenda against me. I am specifically referring to the 2 inspectors from Milwaukee FSDO, although overall, I have been treated fairly by the FAA.

My background:

Professional pilot for 50 years with experience as General Manager, FBO/Owner, Airline Director of Operations, Airline Pilot, Chief Pilot, Instructor Pilot, Check Airman, Chief Instructor, A&P mechanic, IA, 32,600 hours as pilot, 20,000+ hours teaching, 10,000 airline. No violations. Presently hold certification as: Airline Transport Pilot-Single & Multi engine airplanes, DC3 & DC3TP Type ratings, Flight Instructor, airplanes, instruments, multi: Ground Instructor, Advanced & Instruments: Mechanic, Airframe & Powerplant: Inspection Authorization: For the 38 years prior to the accident was a Designated Pilot Examiner for Private, Commercial, Airline Transport, Flight Instructor-Single & Multi engine, Instrument

End of written response to NTSB administrative law judge directly addressing each numbered FAA complaint. February 2022: Received Official Discovery request by FAA lawyer with Interrogatories (including my answers)

Truncated excerpt follows:

INTERROGATORIES

1. Provide the name, occupation, and business address for each person Respondent intends to call as a witness in this proceeding.

No plans to call any witnesses on my behalf

2. Provide the substance and basis of the testimony to be offered by each of witnesses identified in response to Interrogatory 1 above.

None

State the name, occupation, business address, and telephone number for each expert witness Respondent intends to call as a witness in this proceeding.State the qualifications, experience, and training of each person identified in response to Interrogatory 3 above accompanied by his/her Curriculum Vitae.

None

Provide the substance and basis of the testimony to be offered by each of the witnesses identified in response to Interrogatory 3 above.

None

Provide a summary of the substance and basis of the knowledge of each person identified in response to Interrogatory 3 above.

None

State the name, occupation, business address and telephone number of any other person or persons known by the Respondent to have relevant knowledge of and/or information about the matter in this proceeding.

None

Describe each exhibit, other than a document, that Respondent intends to introduce into evidence in this proceeding.

None to be introduced

State the basis for any Affirmative Defenses you intend to raise and provide any relevant information related to said defenses.

My defenses as follows:

Relating to my alleged violation of 14CFR 91. 13 Careless or reckless operation and 14CFR 91.7 Airworthiness: For intentional engine shutdown and continued operation with unsafe nose gear indication.

There is no specific regulation preventing the intentional shutdown/feathering/securing of a single engine on a multi engine aircraft and has never been considered careless or reckless or even referred to as such; in fact, FAA actually recommends this with an inoperative engine to reduce drag on single engine approaches. Common procedure in industry, among professional pilots, is to secure at least one engine, as a precaution to prevent unnecessary aircraft damage when a gear collapse is possible. There is nothing in FAA publications specifically stating that a precautionary feathering, or actual feathering in training environment is unsafe or not permitted. Closest mention are policy statements for examiner conduct during flight tests and recommendations in training publications to simulate engine out operations below 3000 agl. FAA Order 8000.95A pg1.1 clearly delineates the difference between Directives and directives are mandatory, guidance is recommended only. FAA inspectors chose to interpret guidance and policy as regulatory in direct opposition to their own order. Furthermore, Milwaukee inspectors intentionally claimed statements I never made, such as “routinely disregarded FAA policy during training flights and while administering practical tests” completely disregarding that policy is recommended, and not regulatory. I only did this occasionally for realistic training purposes under controlled conditions and never on flight tests. Another false/misleading statement FAA made was the OEI approaches over a populated area carrying a passenger. The one student conducted was over the airport, the one that I did passed over houses for 1/4 mile on a stabilized approach at or above 3 degree glide slope. Nothing out of the ordinary on either approach or landing until I was unable to steer late on the last rollout (500-600′) and there was no greater risk than any other approach. The “passenger” was the private pilot trainee flying the airplane, and no one else was onboard. Then the false statement about the gear lights flashing: I was repeatedly asked this along with how many landings we did with unsafe gear indication (none). I did do 4 touch and goes with progressively heavier loadings on the nose wheel to confirm weight bearing, which it had. Most professional pilots would have done this despite the FAA mocking me for it. 14 CFR 91.3 gives PIC final authority as to the operation of the aircraft and there is no regulation requiring me to land immediately without troubleshooting. In summary; I was in compliance with those rules.

REQUEST TO PRODUCE DOCUMENTS

1. Produce copies of all documents Respondent intends to introduce into evidence in this proceeding, to include, but not limited to reports, letters, memoranda, writings, photographs, drawings, sketches, computer data, audio recordings and transcripts, and video recordings.

Would like to enter the attached photographs showing:

The skid marks,

Damaged aircraft,

Failed forward drag link and fully extended hydraulic strut

.2. Produce a copy of all prior written statements

This completes my response to FAA Interrogatories

The next step in the process is for the Administrative Law Judge to assign a hearing date with 30 days notice. I will post the results of the hearing when I know.

Thanks to all persons that took the time to read this.